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Abstract
Estimating treatment effects for subgroups defined by post-treatment behavior (i.e., esti-
mating causal effects in a principal stratification framework) can be technically challenging and
heavily reliant on strong assumptions. We investigate an alternative path: using bounds to
identify ranges of possible effects that are consistent with the data. This simple approach relies
on fewer assumptions and yet can result in policy-relevant findings. As we show, covariates
can be used to substantially tighten bounds in a straightforward manner. Via simulation, we
demonstrate which types of covariates are maximally beneficial. We conclude with an analysis of
a multi-site experimental study of Early College High Schools. When examining the program’s
impact on students completing the ninth grade “on-track” for college, we find little impact for
ECHS students who would otherwise attend a high quality high school, but substantial effects
for those who would not. This suggests potential benefit in expanding these programs in areas
primarily served by lower quality schools.
Keywords: Principal stratification; Manski bounds; Early College High Schools; multi-site ran-
domized trials; non-compliance
1 Introduction
With the proliferation of randomized trials in education, researchers are asking ever more sophis-
ticated questions about program impacts [Spybrook, 2014]. Collectively, the field is evolving from
first-order questions about “what works overall” to more nuanced questions about what works,
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for whom, when, and under what circumstances [Raudenbush and Bloom, 2015]. That is, re-
searchers and policy makers are interested in better understanding the many ways that impacts
may vary across contexts and subpopulations. When relevant groups are defined by observed,
pre-randomization characteristics, the process for generating causal estimates within subgroups
is typically straightforward. Yet key questions often pertain to subgroups defined by behaviors,
actions, or decisions that occur after randomization.
Principal stratification [Frangakis and Rubin, 2002] provides a framework for considering such
questions. The first step is to specify subgroups, or principal strata, defined by the combination
of experimental subjects’ observed and counterfactual post-randomization actions, behaviors or
responses, and then to articulate estimands associated with each stratum. A key concept of this
approach is that because these subgroups are defined by the combination of potential actions
subjects would take under the different experimental conditions, a subject’s stratum membership
is considered a pre-treatment characteristic, even though it may be unobserved. Within these strata,
researchers then typically aim to estimate the principal causal effects, which are the stratum-specific
intent-to-treat effects of randomization. Procedurally, the analyst first defines the principal strata
and their associated estimands of interest, such as the share of experimental subjects belonging
to each stratum or the stratum-specific principal causal effects. A common next step is to apply
scientific or substantive knowledge (i.e., assumptions) to restrict or inform these quantities, as we
illustrate below.1 Only after these steps does the analyst turn to estimation.
The challenge in estimation is that, even with such restrictions, many quantities of interest are
only “set” rather than “point” identified, meaning that the observed data are entirely consistent
with a range of possible stratum parameter values, rather than just a single point. Many methods
to estimation therefore rely on imposing arguably quite strong distributional and/or independence
assumptions to make progress. These strategies, such as model-based principal stratification (e.g.,
Feller et al. [2016b]; Frumento et al. [2012]; Page [2012]) and principal scores (e.g., Jo and Stuart
[2009]; Stuart and Jo [2015]) can be quite technical to implement and easily can be critiqued as
yielding results that are highly sensitive to their identifying assumptions. Further, even under these
assumptions, estimator performance can be quite poor [Feller et al., 2016a].
An alternative approach is instead to focus on the set of possible parameter values, which are
typically straightforward to obtain. To do this we typically bound the parameter of interest in an
interval by assessing which values are consistent with the observed characteristics of the data. See
Manski [2013] for an overview of this approach. Unfortunately, the range of possible parameter
values within each stratum is often too wide to be substantively meaningful. Therefore, in this
paper we illustrate how to capitalize on baseline covariates to tighten these bounds. In particular,
our key contributions are that we carefully consider procedures for selecting baseline covariates and
investigate the relative gain in precision from selecting covariates of different types. For a more
thorough, and non-technical, introduction to principal stratification itself see Page et al. [2015].
See also Mealli and Mattei [2012] and Schochet et al. [2014].
There is a sizable literature on bounds in this setting. We highlight three papers that explicitly
use covariates to tighten bounds. First, Lee [2009] utilizes bounds to assess the extent to which the
effect of Job Corps on total earnings was a function of increased employment, an increased wage
rate, or both. The analytic challenge Lee faces is that any improvement in wage rate can only be
assessed for those who would be employed regardless of the intervention. Grilli and Mealli [2008]
use a bounds approach in the context of observational studies. Long and Hudgens [2013] provide
some technical conditions under which certain covariates tighten bounds. We extend this work by
1For example, we might argue that certain strata do not exist (akin to the monotonicity or “no defiers” assumption
critical to instrumental variables estimation) or that the treatment has no effect on outcomes in other strata (normally
called an exclusion restriction).
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investigating how an analyst should best select and combine different baseline covariates to tighten
bounds in practice.
We structure the remainder of the paper as follows. We first introduce a multi-site, multi-
cohort randomized controlled trial investigating the Early College High School (ECHS) model.
This experimental evaluation motivates and serves as the substantive focus of this work. We then
introduce our key research question and devise the principal stratification setup and associated
estimands of interest. We illustrate how to directly estimate certain stratum-specific quantities and
how to obtain bounds for those quantities that are not point identified. Finally, we discuss the use
of covariates for tightening bounds and detail the relative gains to be made with different covariate
choices, both via simulation and via an analysis of our motivating example.
Throughout, we aim to underscore bounding as an approach that is computationally straight-
forward and that can provide general insight for principal causal effects. Importantly, the analytic
strategies that we present are transparent and can be adapted and used by the majority of quan-
titative researchers in education using standard software.2 We also include the relevant details
of our derivations in the hopes that illustrating the process step by step will help others conduct
similar analyses for their own principal stratification scenarios. As we show, the insights produced
from covariate-tightened bounds can be of use in real contexts for guiding policy and programmatic
decisions.
2 Early College High Schools
High school graduation is often a minimum requirement for adult labor market success. Nonetheless,
nearly one fifth of U.S. students do not attain a high school degree [Kena et al., 2015]. Further-
more, among students who graduate from high school, many begin college or join the workforce
without the skills necessary to succeed [Sparks and Malkus, 2013]. Educators and policymakers
have responded to these problems by developing new secondary school models. One such model is
the Early College High School (ECHS).
The Early College High School (ECHS) Initiative began in 2002 with the goal of increasing high
school graduation rates and college enrollment. ECHSs are typically autonomous small schools
managed by local school districts in partnership with two- or four-year colleges. ECHS students
generally begin taking college-level courses in ninth grade and have the opportunity to graduate high
school with an associate’s degree and/or two years of transferable college credit. There are three
primary mechanisms through which ECHSs aim to increase high school graduation and college
readiness and enrollment among students who are underrepresented in college, including first-
generation, low-income and minority students. First, they attempt to stimulate students’ interest
in higher education through exposure to college-style courses. Second, they aim to build students’
confidence about their ability to succeed in a postsecondary environment. Third, they provide
students opportunities to earn college credits in high school, thus lessening the future financial
burden of college. Additionally, ECHSs in North Carolina promote rigorous instructional practices,
positive student-staff relationships and academic and student supports, which also may increase
student achievement in and after high school.
Experimental research on ECHSs in North Carolina to date indicates that the ECHSs studied
had a significant positive impact on a host of outcomes related to high school achievement and
completion as well as college enrollment and degree attainment [Edmunds et al., 2016]. Of particular
interest is success in ninth grade, given the compelling descriptive evidence that students who do
2R and Stata routines for this context are available upon request. This code could be used as a template for other
scenarios.
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well in ninth grade are more likely to succeed in and complete high school [Allensworth and Easton,
2005]. Edmunds et al. [2010] found that being assigned to an ECHS had strong, positive impacts on
ninth grade student outcomes. Students given access to an ECHS were significantly more likely to
enroll in and complete Algebra I, considered a gateway course for college-preparatory mathematics
[Dougherty et al., 2015], as well as have lower rates of school absence and suspension. In addition,
those offered the ECHS opportunity were five percentage points more likely to be “on-track” for
college at the completion of ninth grade, meaning that they were on-track to complete the Future-
Ready Core Graduation Requirements specified by the state of North Carolina.3 These promising
results beg for further investigation into where and for whom the ECHS model is particularly
beneficial.
2.1 Research question
One possibility is that these top-line effects mask policy-relevant heterogeneity according to the
type of school in which a student would enroll absent the ECHS offer. Indeed, the control students
attended one of a number of different secondary schools that ranged substantially in overall quality,
and we might believe that the variation in impact of the ECHS offer could be associated with
variation across alternative contexts. Recent work in other domains has found similar relationships.
Examining data from the Head Start Impact Study, Feller et al. [2016b] and Kline and Walters
[2016] find that the impact of participating in Head Start, a large federally funded preschool program
for low-income three and four-year-old children, varies according to the type of care a child would
have otherwise received, with effects primarily for those who would be cared for in a home-based
setting rather than those who would otherwise attend another child-care center. This is presumably
because the shift from a home-based setting to the Head Start center setting represented a larger
experiential change. Similarly, in a study of a school choice lottery in Charlotte-Mecklenburg,
Deming et al. [2014] find that impacts of winning the lottery were largest for students living in
areas with (and presumably who would otherwise attend) low-quality neighborhood schools.
In this spirit, we investigate variation in the impact on ninth-grade high school success of
participating in an ECHS, according to variation in the quality of the high school in which ECHS
participants would enroll absent the ECHS offer. This question is policy relevant. If, for example,
the ECHS opportunity has a larger impact on outcomes for those who would otherwise attend
a low-quality high school, then policymakers may prioritize locating new ECHSs in geographic
settings where the existing public school opportunities are of low quality. Similarly, policymakers
may see ECHSs as a viable reform strategy to improve faltering schools. Such variation also could
motivate investigating quality of implementation of the ECHS model across different contexts. In
short, our analytic goal is to differentiate treatment effects of ECHS participation for students
who would otherwise attend a low-quality public school from those who would otherwise attend a
high-quality public school.
2.2 Data
We utilize data from the Evaluation of Early College High Schools in North Carolina [Edmunds
et al., 2010]. Our sample includes 4,004 students across 6 cohorts who began ninth grade between
2005 and 2010. Across these years, sample students participated in one of 44 lotteries to gain
entry into one of 19 different ECHSs included in the ECHS evaluation. In each lottery, students
3The Future-Ready Core is designed to ensure that every student will graduate from high school prepared
for the workforce and postsecondary education. For more information about the specific requirements, see:
http://www.dpi.state.nc.us/docs/gradrequirements/resources/gradchecklists.pdf.
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randomized to treatment received an offer to attend an ECHS; those randomized to control did
not receive an ECHS offer. Both treatment and control students were tracked through high school
and college using data from the North Carolina Department of Instruction (NCDPI), the North
Carolina Community College System and the National Student Clearinghouse. We limited our
sample to students who could be linked to NCDPI data, had school enrollment data in ninth grade
and had transcript data or End or Course (EOC) exam data from NCDPI. We also excluded the
small number of students who we believe to have moved as the ninth grade school they attended
was more than 20 miles away from the eighth grade school they attended, under the assumption
that these large distances effectively dropped these students from the trial. Our analysis sample
under these business rules is 3,820 students.4
2.3 School quality
Up to this point, we have used the term “school quality” informally and recognize that many defi-
nitions are possible. The State of North Carolina uses a school report card system that considers a
range of school-level measures, such as student performance on end-of-course tests, the share of stu-
dents taught by “high quality” teachers, share of students taking the SAT, and various other growth
indicators and scores.5 The report card also includes a rating classification, one of nine categories
based on achievement measures, growth and adequate yearly progress. For this study, we classify
schools designated by the state as “Priority Schools”, “Low Performing Schools” and “Schools
receiving no recognition” as low-quality schools and classify those designated as “Schools making
High Growth,” “Schools making Expected Growth,” “Honor Schools of Excellence”, “Schools of
Excellence,” and “Schools of Progress” as high-quality schools.6 With designations collapsed in
this way, we are able to categorize students as having attended an ECHS, a low-quality school, or
a high-quality school.7
In Table 1, we present the distribution of students across these three school settings in their
ninth grade year. In the treatment group, 86 percent of students attended an ECHS, 2.5 percent
attended a high-quality school, and 11.5 percent a low-quality school. In the control group, only 3
percent were able to cross over and register in an ECHS; 14 percent attended a high-quality school;
and 83 percent attended a low-quality school. Next, we turn to the specific principal stratification
set up that frames our investigation.
3 Defining Principal Strata
To define our principal strata we first introduce notation. We use a finite population framework
with potential outcomes (Splawa-Neyman et al. [1990], see also, e.g., Imbens and Rubin [2015]).
4Our overall attrition rate is 4.6 percent and differential attrition is 2.1 percent which puts us well within WWC
attrition standards. Including the predicted movers has little to no impact on the analyses presented in the paper.
5See https://ssri.duke.edu/data-it-services/north-carolina-education-research-data-center-ncerdc.
6See http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/accountability/reporting/abc/2005-06/execsumm.html for detailed
descriptions of categories. The state does not rate special education schools, schools in hospitals, vocational schools
and schools with unresolved data. We grouped all schools without a rating into their own category. Among schools
we classify as high-quality, the majority (83%) are classified by the state as “Schools of Distinction,” and among
those that we classify as low-quality, the majority (89%) are rated by the state as “Schools of Progress.”
7It is worth noting that ECHSs also receive quality ratings from the state, and some ECHS schools in our sample
are rated as low-quality schools. However, we treat ECHSs as their own quality category because an ECHS is guided
by different principles than a traditional school and provides students with a different experience that may not be
captured in school ratings.
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School type Treatment Control
(N = 2,229) (N = 1,591)
Early College HS (e) 86.0% 2.9%
High Quality Public HS (hq) 2.5% 13.9%
Low Quality Public HS (lq) 11.5% 83.2%
Table 1: Distribution of high school type attended by treatment status
In this framework we take as our entire population the N students in our sample, indexed with
i = 1, . . . , N , on which the experiment was conducted. We take the finite sample approach to
explicitly focus on the primary source of randomness—the treatment assignment itself—and to
avoid the need to make assumptions of the sample being representative of some larger infinite
population. In our case it also makes the definition of the estimands of interest more explicit,
especially when we stratify by baseline covariate. For further general discussion see, for example,
Rosenbaum [2009] or Imbens and Rubin [2015]. To continue, let Yi(0), Yi(1) be student i’s potential
outcomes, given possible treatment assignments Zi = 0 or Zi = 1. We assume the Stable Unit
Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), which states that the observed outcomes of a student are
fully described by that student’s assignment and not the assignment of the student’s peers [Rubin,
1980].8 Similarly, what school type a child attends also depends on treatment, so we consider this
post-treatment behavior a potential outcome in its own right. In particular, in the context of this
study, school type attended can take on one of three levels: ECHS (e), low-quality (lq), or high-
quality (hq). Then let Si(z) ∈ {e, lq, hq} be the categorical variable of what school type student i
attends if assigned treatment Zi = z.
These Si(z) variables are key: we define our principal strata by the joint distribution of these
intermediate variables under treatment and control. In the ECHS context, for example, the prin-
cipal strata are defined by the pair of potential school types students would attend if assigned to
treatment, Si(1), and if assigned to control, Si(0).
Given our three different focal schools types, there are at most nine different strata, represented
by the nine cells in Table 2. Each student belongs to exactly one of these cells, depending on
that student’s Si(0) and Si(1). For example, a student who would go to an ECHS school under
treatment (Si(1) = e), and a low quality school under control (Si(0) = lq), would be in stratum (2).
The strata contain distinct groups of students, and each of these groups has its own stratum-specific
average treatment impact. To simplify the problem, we next apply two assumptions that serve to
reduce the number of possible strata from nine to five.
The first assumption is the monotonicity assumption, which states that there are no students
who would enroll in an ECHS when not offered access but who would not take up the opportunity
to enroll when offered.
Assumption 1. (Monotonicity/No Defiers.) No individuals have Si(0) = e and Si(1) 6= e.
Due to this assumption we rule out the existence of strata 4 and 7 (see Table 2).
The second assumption states that the ECHS offer does not change the school setting for
students choosing between non-ECHS options. For example, the offer does not induce students to
switch from a low-quality to a high-quality school.
8SUTVA here, as in most non-compliance settings, is a bit subtle in that it is regarding treatment offer. The
additional formalism around treatment take-up as potential outcomes in their own right allow us to identify the
impact of treatment receipt (school attendance). We also note that the non-interference is somewhat suspect due to
students being peers in different schools; we follow much of the education literature in assuming these interference
impacts are minimal when looking at subsets of students in larger institutions, as we are doing.
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Assumption 2. (Irrelevant Alternatives.) No individuals have Si(0) = hq and Si(1) = lq or
Si(0) = lq and Si(1) = hq.
The underlying reasoning here is that since the availability of other schooling options is not
affected by the ECHS offer, preferences among the non-ECHS options should not be affected by an
offer to attend an ECHS school. Thus, we rule out strata 6 and 8.
We now have five remaining principal strata: ECHS always-takers (EAT), low-quality compliers
(LQC), high-quality compliers (HQC), low-quality always-takers (LQAT), and high-quality always-
takers (HQAT), illustrated in Table 2. We encode individual strata membership with, for each
student, Ri ∈ {eat, lqat, lqc, hqat, hqc}. Ri is a function of the pair (Si(0), Si(1)).
NO ECHS offer (Zi = 0)
Si(0) = e Si(0) = lq Si(0) = hq
E
C
H
S
off
er
(Z
i
=
1
)
Si(1) = e (1) ECHS (2) Low-quality (3) High-quality
always taker complier complier
Si(1) = lq (4) (5) Low-quality (6)
always taker
Si(1) = hq (7) (8) (9) High-quality
always taker
Table 2: Our principal strata. We have nine possible strata given the three
possible school-types a student could attend under treatment and control. We
assume that no students fall in strata (4), (6), (7) and (8), as discussed in the
text, leaving us with the five remaining groups.
With our principal strata defined, we can turn to defining our parameters of interest. In
particular, we are interested in the share of students in each stratum, pir, and the stratum outcome
means under treatment and control, µr(z). The relative strata proportions are pir = Nr/N , where
Nr is the number of students in stratum r. The mean outcomes under both treatment and control
are
µr(z) =
1
Nr
N∑
i=1
1{Ri=r}Yi(z),
where 1{A=a} is the indicator function evaluating to 1 if A = a and 0 otherwise. All these quantities
are fixed, pre-treatment.
In total, there are 5× 3 = 15 population parameters of interest (a pir, µr(1), and µr(0) for each
stratum), and our primary substantive goal is to estimate treatment effects of ECHS participation
for low-quality and high-quality compliers. This effect for the LQC group is
ITTlqc = µlqc(1)− µlqc(0)
=
1
Nlqc
N∑
i=1
1{Ri=lqc} (Yi(1)− Yi(0)) .
ITThqc is analogous.
3.1 Defining our directly estimable quantities
The above determines the parameters, but we of course do not observe these quantities directly.
Instead, after individuals are randomized to treatment or control, for each student i we observe
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three variables: Zi, an indicator of treatment; S
obs
i = Si(Zi), the observed school type attended;
and Y obsi = Yi(Zi), student i’s observed outcome. We also know each individual’s probability of
treatment assignment, which is captured in a weight wi (we return to a discussion of weights later
in the paper). Unfortunately, we do not fully observe Ri, individual stratum membership, because
that would require seeing both Si(0) and Si(1), and we only see one of these. This means we
only partially know which stratum any particular student is in. We do, however, observe groups
defined by Zi and S
obs
i , which are mixtures of students from different strata. Therefore, outcome
distributions within these observed groups are mixtures of outcomes across different principal strata.
The goal of estimation and bounding is, in essence, to separate out these mixtures.
In particular, we have six groups based on the combination of treatment assignment and sub-
sequent school attended. We index these groups with zs, with z ∈ {0, 1} and s ∈ {e, lq, hq}. Each
student will be a member of two of these groups, one for each potential treatment, and membership
in one group will be directly observable for each student. Due to random assignment, we obtain
random samples of all six groups, meaning we can estimate the characteristics of these groups. In
other words, the parameters associated with these groups are directly identifiable, and thus we use
them as the building blocks for estimating the actual parameters of interest pertaining to the five
principal strata.
First, we can directly estimate the number of students who, if assigned treatment z, go to
school-type s:
Nzs =
N∑
i=1
1{Si(z)=s}.
We then have ρzs = Nzs/N , the proportion of all the students who would go to school-type s
if assigned treatment z.9 For example, ρ1e is the proportion of the students who, when offered the
ECHS opportunity, actually enroll in an ECHS school. For clarity note:
ρze + ρzlq + ρzhq = 1 for z = 0, 1.
Similarly, let Y zs be the mean outcomes of all those who, if assigned to treatment z, would go
to school-type s:
Y zs =
1
Nzs
N∑
i=1
1{Si(z)=s}Yi(z).
The ρzs and Y zs are parameters of our finite population. Because of random assignment and
SUTVA, we can estimate these quantities directly. Throughout the subsequent discussion on iden-
tifiability we therefore assume that we have full knowledge of these intermediate ρzs and Y zs. These
are our building blocks, and we characterize the pir, the µr(z), and finally the ITTr in terms of
these values. We purposefully defer issues of estimation and uncertainty to Section 5. We next
discuss calculating the pir, and then the µr(z).
3.2 Identifying the proportions
In this principal stratification set up, we are able to point identify the distribution of students
across the five strata of interest. Assuming we can identify the ρzs, we are able to identify pir for
r ∈ {eat, lqat, lqc, hqat, hqc}. More generally, if strata of interest are defined by a cross-tabulation
9We divide by N because these Nzs are the share of the entire sample that would, if the entire sample were
assigned treatment z, end up at school type s. Under a finite sample model, each student will be in two of the groups
defined by z and s, and Nzlq +Nzhq +Nze = N for both z = 0 and z = 1.
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of x rows and y columns, then several parameters, such as the share of student in each stratum
and the average value of baseline characteristics, are point identified if (x − 1) × (y − 1) cells are
eliminated from possibility and at least one cell remains in each row and in each column. In Table 2
these conditions are met.
In the ECHS experiment, students who are offered ECHS enrollment either accept or not. If
they do not, we observe the school type that they select instead. This allows direct estimation of
the proportion of low- and high-quality always-takers (pilqat = ρ1lq and pihqat = ρ1hq).
Students, when not offered treatment, either cross over into an ECHS or stay in their respective
quality schools. This allows direct estimation of the proportion of ECHS always-takers as pieat = ρ0e.
Those students who stay in their respective school types under control assignment are combinations
of two different types of students. For example, those students who would enroll in a low-quality
public school under control are either low-quality compliers or low-quality always-takers. This leads
to the following equalities:
ρ0lq = pilqc + pilqat
and
ρ0hq = pihqc + pihqat.
We then plug in our known quantities to obtain the other.
In sum, we can obtain pilqat, pihqat, and pieat directly and can express the remaining stratum
proportions as functions of observable values, as follows:
pilqc = ρ0lq − pilqat = ρ0lq − ρ1lq and
pihqc = ρ0hq − pihqat = ρ0hq − ρ1hq.
3.3 Identifying individual stratum outcome means
We obtain stratum-specific treatment effects by obtaining the treatment and control means, µr(z),
which make up the treatment contrasts. To do so, we first apply an additional assumption that
serves to constrain certain means. This allows us to disentangle observed mixtures of different
student types.
Assumption 3. (Exclusion restrictions.) For students with Ri ∈ {eat, lqat, hqat}, Yi(0) = Yi(1).
This assumption states that there is no impact of the randomized offer of ECHS enrollment for
students whose school type is unchanged by randomization. This implies that the treatment effect
is zero in these three strata. Furthermore, this means the associated stratum-specific means are
point identified because each type of always-taker is isolated in one or the other of the treatment
arms. Therefore we have
µlqat(0) = µlqat(1) = µlqat = Y 1lq
µhqat(0) = µhqat(1) = µhqat = Y 1hq
µeat(0) = µeat(1) = µeat = Y 0e.
Next, because the group of students who experience a low-quality school setting under assign-
ment to control is a mixture of low-quality compliers and low-quality always-takers, the mean
outcome of these students is a weighted average of the respective mean control outcomes of the two
principal strata, weighted by their relative sizes:
Y 0lq =
pilqc
pilqc + pilqat
µlqc(0) +
pilqat
pilqc + pilqat
µlqat(0).
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We rearrange to get
µlqc(0) =
pilqc + pilqat
pilqc
Y 0lq − pilqat
pilqc
µlqat(0).
Plugging in µlqat(0) = Y 1lq and our proportion relations, we can express our control mean as a
combination of directly estimable quantities:
µlqc(0) =
ρ0lq
ρ0lq − ρ1lq Y 0lq −
ρ1lq
ρ0lq − ρ1lq Y 1lq. (1)
The expression for µhqc(0) is analogous, with the ρzlq and Y zlq replaced by the ρzhq and Y zhq.
We have directly obtained the mean control outcome for our two groups of interest. We can
also obtain the average of our two groups of interest by averaging the above two means weighted
by the relative sizes of the two groups:
M0 =
pilqc
pilqc + pihqc
µlqc(0) +
pihqc
pilqc + pihqc
µhqc(0).
This would be the overall complier mean outcome under control.
Means of covariates within strata. We can also identify the mean of any pre-treatment co-
variate Xi for all five strata using the various formula for the µr(0) by replacing the observed
means Y zs with analogous Xzs. In particular, we first estimate the means of the groups we directly
identify, and then back out the mean of the two complier groups using Equation 1.
The treatment means of the compliers. The only outcome means that remain are the means
for low-quality and high-quality compliers under assignment to treatment (µlqc(1) and µhqc(1)).
Students who take up the ECHS offer under assignment to the treatment are a mixture of three
types of students, and so the observed mean is a weighted average of these groups:
Y 1e =
pieat
pieat + pilqc + pihqc
µeat +
pilqc
pieat + pilqc + pihqc
µlqc(1) +
pihqc
pieat + pilqc + pihqc
µhqc(1). (2)
The exclusion restriction allows us to obtain µeat = Y 0e, but we cannot separate the two means of
interest, µlqc(1) and µhqc(1). These parameters are those that are not point identified but are set
identified. That is, we will be able to obtain upper and lower bounds for these parameters and also
characterize the trade-off between the two, but we cannot obtain them exactly.
We can, however, identify the overall complier mean outcome under treatment, M1, which is
simply a weighted average between µlqc(1) and µhqc(1):
M1 ≡ pilqc
pilqc + pihqc
µlqc(1) +
pihqc
pilqc + pihqc
µhqc(1) (3)
By rearranging Equation 2 by moving the term with µeat to the left side and then rescaling both
sides by (pieat + pilqc + pihqc)/(pilqc + pihqc) we have
M1 =
pieat + pilqc + pihqc
pilqc + pihqc
Y 1e − pieat
pilqc + pihqc
µeat
=
ρ1e
ρ1e − ρ0eY 1e −
ρ0e
ρ1e − ρ0eY 0e.
The last step comes from plugging in earlier expressions for the pir and µeat terms.
M1 is a weighted average of our two means of interest, which allows us to characterize possible
trade-offs. In particular, if one stratum mean is large, the other must be small. Overall, to bound
µlqc(1) and µhqc(1) we explore possible combinations with a weighted average equal to this M1.
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3.4 Illustration on ECHS Data
To make this process concrete, we turn to the ECHS data (which we discuss more fully in Section 7).
Our outcome of interest is a binary indicator for whether a student is on-track at the end of ninth
grade. We first calculate the share of students within each observable group defined by treatment
assignment and type of school attended. Within these groups, we calculate the average value of
the outcome. We present these results in Table 3.
These quantities are the actual number of students, estimated mean outcomes, and estimated
overall proportions for each group. Students were weighted according to their differential proba-
bilities of receiving treatment, which sometimes differed by demographic characteristics [Edmunds
et al., 2016], and the estimates incorporate these weights (we discuss how to do this in Section 5).
The random assignment mechanism means the students observed to be in a given group are a
random sample of all students who could be in the group, which allows for this estimation.
Group Z S Nzs Ŷzs pˆzs
0e 0 e 43 100 3
0hq 0 hq 220 97 14
0lq 0 lq 1328 86 83
1e 1 e 1917 95 86
1hq 1 hq 53 90 3
1lq 1 lq 259 84 12
Table 3: Observed subgroup outcomes for ECHS study. Z and S divide our
population into 6 groups. The Nzs are the total number of students in each
group. Ŷzs (in percents) are the estimated mean outcomes of each group (i.e.,
the percent of the group on-track). They estimate the Y zs. The pˆzs (in per-
cents), estimating ρzs, are the estimated fractions of the groups in the given
treatment arms.
Our analytic goal is to estimate the 15 stratum-specific parameters, pir, µr(0), and µr(1) for r ∈
{eat, hqat, lqat, hqc, lqc}. As articulated above, the sample results in Table 3 allow us to estimate
13 of the 15 parameters. These estimates are in the left three columns of Table 4. We cannot,
however, directly estimate the remaining two parameters, µlqc(1) and µhqc(1).
One thing we can do is estimate the overall complier outcome mean under treatment and
control. We estimate M̂1 = 0.95 and M̂0 = 0.88, for an overall estimated complier average causal
effect of 0.07, or a 7 percentage point change in the on-track status of the students. Analytically,
our goal is to disentangle this overall complier average causal effect into separate effects for those
compliers who would otherwise attend low-quality schools and those who would otherwise attend
high-quality schools. Since the treatment group means contributing to these separate effects are
not point identified, we bound them based on directly observed quantities.
The fourth and final columns show the bounds we obtain for these quantities, and the associ-
ated bounds on the ITT estimates themselves. Although these bounds are fairly wide, they are
nevertheless informative. The treatment impacts on the compliers who would attend a low-quality
high school absent the ECHS offer are definitively positive and substantial, indicating that ECHS
participation increases on-track status by somewhere between 8 to 14 percentage points for these
students. The effects for the high-quality compliers are less encouraging. Although these may be
slightly positive, they could also be quite negative, potentially reducing the share of students on
track by 34 percentage points.
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Figure 1(b) illustrates the potential tradeoffs possible: if the HQC effect is substantially nega-
tive, the LQC effect is relatively larger, and vice-versa. All possible pairs of effects must lie on the
line segment corresponding to an overall complier average effect of M1 −M0. We discuss how to
obtain these bounds next.
Stratum pir µr(0) µr(1) ITTr
eat 0.03 1.00 1.00 0
hqat 0.03 0.90 0.90 0
hqc 0.11 0.99 (0.64, 1.00) (−0.34, 0.01)
lqat 0.12 0.84 0.84 0
lqc 0.72 0.86 (0.94, 1.00) (0.08, 0.14)
Table 4: Estimated population parameters for ECHS study with corresponding
average treatment effects. Ranges (in parentheses) are from bounding parame-
ters that are not point-identified.
4 Calculating bounds in terms of directly observed quantities
We know the weighted average of µlqc(1) and µhqc(1) equals our observed overall complier mean,
as shown on Equation 3. We also know that each mean must lie in the [0, 1] interval because our
outcome of interest is binary, i.e., Yi ∈ {0, 1}. The restricted range of Yi means the µr(1) cannot
be dominated by extreme values, making this bounding exercise possible. Bounds with continuous
Yi are possible in some circumstances; see, for example, Lee [2009].
To get expressions of the bounds we solve for one of our means of interest. For example, when
we solve Equation 3 for µlqc(1) we get
µlqc(1) =
pilqc + pihqc
pilqc
M1 − pihqc
pilqc
µhqc(1) (4)
This shows, for example, that for µlqc(1) to be non-negative, µhqc(1) must be no larger than
pilqc+pihqc
pihqc
M1. We can further explore the range of possible trade-offs by plugging different possible
values of µhqc(1) into Equation 4. This is shown on Figure 1(a). The overall bounds come from
considering what happens to each mean when the other mean is maximal or minimal, coupled with
restricting each mean to the [0, 1] interval.
For the low-quality compliers, we have bounds of
max
(
0,
pilqc + pihqc
pilqc
M1 − pihqc
pilqc
)
≤ µlqc(1) ≤ min
(
pilqc + pihqc
pilqc
M1, 1
)
.
The derivation of the lower bound corresponds to plugging µhqc(1) = 1 into Equation 4: the lowest
possible bound for the LQC group is when the mean for the HQC group is maximal.
For the high-quality compliers, by symmetry, we can swap the lqc with the hqc in the above
expressions.
The final bounds. With bounds on these stratum means under treatment, we are able to obtain
bounds on the stratum-specific treatment effects for these two groups. For ITTlqc = µlqc(1)−µlqc(0)
we have
µlqc(1)
low − µlqc(0) ≤ ITTlqc ≤ µlqc(1)high − µlqc(0) (5)
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Figure 1: The possible trade-offs between the treatment means and treatment
effects of the LQC and HQC group. On left, each point on the dark segment
represents a possible value for the pair µlqc(1), µhqc(1) that would give an overall
mean of M1 = 0.95. The right hand side is simply the left shifted by the control
means of each group.
with
µlqc(1)
low ≡ max
(
0,
pilqc + pihqc
pilqc
M1 − pihqc
pilqc
)
µlqc(1)
high ≡ min
(
pilqc + pihqc
pilqc
M1, 1
)
and
µlqc(0) ≡ pilqc + pilqat
pilqc
Y 0lq − pilqat
pilqc
µlqat.
The bounds are a rescaled M1 separated by pihqc/pilqc and cropped by 0 and 1.
To get these in our directly identifiable quantities, plug in our expressions for the ρzs and
remaining Y zs to get
µlqc(1)
low = max
(
0,
ρ1e − ρ0e
ρ0lq − ρ1lqM1 −
ρ0hq − ρ1hq
ρ0lq − ρ1lq
)
µlqc(1)
high = min
(
ρ1e − ρ0e
ρ0lq − ρ1lqM1, 1
)
µlqc(0) =
ρ0lq
ρ0lq − ρ1lq Y 0lq −
ρ1lq
ρ0lq − ρ1lq Y 1lq
with
M1 =
ρ1e
ρ1e − ρ0eY 1e −
ρ0e
ρ1e − ρ0eY 0e.
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The width of the bound is governed by pihqc/pilqc = (ρ0hq − ρ1hq)/(ρ0lq − ρ1lq), the ratio of high-
to low-quality compliers. This makes sense: if the overall group is mostly low-quality compliers,
resulting in a small ratio, then the LQC average effect has to be close to the overall average effect.
It also shows that if M1 is close to 1, the inflation factor will scale M1 above 1, so it gets cropped,
giving a shorter bound. Similarly, if M1 is close to 0, then the rescaled M1 minus the pihqc/pilqc
term will be negative, and the bound will therefore get cropped below by 0, also shortening it.
For the high quality compliers we analogously have ITThqc = µhqc(1)− µhqc(0) with
µhqc(1)
low = max
(
0,
ρ1e − ρ0e
ρ0hq − ρ1hqM1 −
ρ0lq − ρ1lq
ρ0hq − ρ1hq
)
µhqc(1)
high = min
(
ρ1e − ρ0e
ρ0hq − ρ1hqM1, 1
)
µlqc(0) =
ρ0hq
ρ0hq − ρ1hq Y 0hq −
ρ1hq
ρ0hq − ρ1hq Y 1hq.
For the high quality compliers, the width is governed by pilqc/pihqc.
These bounds are sharp in that they are the shortest possible given the directly identified
quantities. In particular, given these bounds one could assign strata memberships so as to be
entirely consistent with either extreme. Conceptually this can be done by assigning those individuals
with better outcomes to one of the two groups until that group is “full,” and then calculating the
outcome for the other group with the individuals that remain. Furthermore, these overall bounds’
widths are dominated by the ratio of the proportions of high to low quality compliers. In particular,
if a group represents a relatively small proportion of the compliers, it will tend to have very wide
bounds. Bound width is not related to sample size. Sample size would impact uncertainty, however,
and in small samples this uncertainty could be of greater magnitude than the bound widths (see
Section 5).
We address the estimation of uncertainty in all of these estimates in Section 5. With the goal
of restricting the range of possible values for the groups we now turn to narrowing bounds using
predictive covariates.
4.1 Narrowing bounds through covariate stratification
We tighten our bounds by exploiting pre-treatment covariates predictive of outcome and/or post-
treatment behavior. In particular, we will slice our overall sample of N students into K slices,
with these slices being defined by pre-treatment covariates and thus being conceptually fixed prior
to randomization. This type of analytic process is typically referred to as covariate (or post)
stratification. For clearer prose regarding principal stratification and covariate stratification, here
we say slice rather than stratum to refer to the subsets of the sample defined by observable baseline
covariate values. Each slice is then its own sub-experiment on Nk students, which we can assess
just as with a single overall experiment. We will calculate bounds within these separate slices of the
data, and then aggregate across them to get the overall bound. As we show, this can be an effective
strategy for tightening bounds, provided the covariates are sufficiently predictive of post-treatment
behavior and/or the outcome.
We discuss estimating effects for the LQC group. The procedure for the HQC group is analogous.
First, we represent slice membership with a pre-treatment membership variable Xi ∈ {1, . . . ,K},
which we observe. Within each slice k, we wish to obtain the LQC average treatment effect:
ITT klqc =
1
Nlqc,k
∑
i:Xi=k
1{Ri=lqc} (Yi(1)− Yi(0)) ,
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with Nlqc,k = Nkpi
k
lqc, the total number of LQC students in slice k.
The overall ITTlqc across slices can then be expressed as
ITTlqc =
1
Nlqc
K∑
k=1
Nlqc,k
1
Nlqc,k
∑
i:Xi=k
1{Ri=lqc} (Yi(1)− Yi(0))
=
K∑
k=1
Nlqc,k
Nlqc
ITT klqc
=
K∑
k=1
Nk
N
piklqc
pilqc
ITT klqc (6)
The overall average treatment impact is a weighted average of slice-level treatment impacts, with
weights depending on the size of the slice as well as the relative proportion of low-quality compliers
in the slice to the proportion of low-quality compliers overall. We are weighting each slice’s average
effect by the number of low-quality compliers in the slice.
Using the main results from above, we first obtain bounds within each of the slices:
µk,lowlqc (1)− µklqc(0) ≤ ITT klqc ≤ µk,highlqc (1)− µklqc(0)
for k = 1, . . . ,K.
The overall bounds then immediately follow by plugging in the slice-specific lower (upper)
bounds terms for the ITT klqc into Equation 6 to get the overall lower (upper) bound. For example
ITTlqc ≤
K∑
k=1
Nk
N
piklqc
pilqc
ITT k,highlqc . (7)
The overall bounds from recombining the slices simply restricts the possible trade-offs of ITTlqc
and ITThqc as compared to the original full-sample bounds. In particular, the overall trade-off
of ITTlqc and ITThqc is still linear—the overall weighted average of the treatment means still
needs to average to M1—so if we graph the potential set of treatment effect pairs, it will still be
a line segment, and we can graph this set of possible pairs of (ITTlqc, ITThqc) by drawing a line
connecting the two pairs of (ITT lowlqc , ITT
high
hqc ) and (ITT
high
lqc , ITT
low
hqc ). This bound will be a subset
of the original bound (up to estimation uncertainty). See the Supplementary Material for a simple
argument for these observations.
4.2 When stratification helps
In examining the components of the overall bounds given on Equation 5 and its high quality
equivalent, we see that the width of the bound is primarily governed by the relative proportion
of the two types of compliers, pihqc/pilqc for low quality compliers and pilqc/pihqc for high quality
compliers. There is a substantial trade-off here: more of one complier type means shorter bounds
for that type and longer bounds for the other. We can also achieve a narrower width if M1 has an
extreme value. For example, if M1 is near 1, meaning the average outcome of all ECHS compliers is
close to 1, this causes the bound to be truncated from above. Similarly, if M1 is close to 0, meaning
the average outcome for all ECHS compliers is close to 0, this causes the bound to be truncated
from below.
These observations suggest two strategies for obtaining narrow bounds within a slice. The first,
using the LQCs as an example, is to make slices with relatively more LQCs than HQCs to make
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our ratio for the LQC group small and the bound tight. Second, if most of the students in a slice
have the same outcome, then truncation could give a narrower bound.
The first strategy suggests we slice based on variables predictive of being a LQC versus a HQC.
One such variable would be the principal score, i.e., a prediction of what type of complier a student
would be, if they were a complier and given their full baseline covariate vectors. We call related
variables principal variables. The second suggests we slice based on variables predictive of the
outcome. One such variable is the prognostic score, i.e., the predicted outcome of a student given
his or her baseline covariates (and excluding treatment assignment). We call related variables
prognostic variables. One type of variable not suggested by the above would be ones that predict
overall ECHS compliance, i.e., those that predict being a complier (of any type) vs. an always-taker
(which we call compliance variables).
One might worry that slicing to get tight bounds for one group would give poor bounds for the
other, given the first strategy. It turns out that this is not an issue: the first strategy essentially
segregates the two types of units, and as the ratio for a group will tend to be large precisely for those
slices that contain few students of that group, when we average the bounds across the slices, these
wider bounds get low weight, producing tighter overall bounds. In fact, even if in the overall sample
one type dominates, as long as we can slice to have the less represented group mostly isolated in a
few slices we can obtain tighter bounds for both.
We further explore these themes, as well as the question of whether to focus on principal or
prognostic variables for slicing a sample, in a simulation study that we discuss in Section 6.
5 Estimation
In the discussion above, the ρzs and Y zs, are fixed, pre-randomization quantities (i.e., finite popu-
lation parameters) and are not directly observable given the data. We now turn to how to estimate
these quantities with data and known random assignment mechanisms such as one has with a
randomized experiment or school lottery.
Let estimates of the Y zs be Ŷzs and ρzs be pˆzs. Then, as long as these individual estimates are
asymptotically consistent, i.e., as long as pˆze → ρzs and Ŷzs → Y zs as n increases, if we plug them
in to our bounds formula the bounds estimates too will be asymptotically consistent. Obtaining
asymptotically consistent estimators is typically quite straightforward; in particular, weighted mean
estimators tend to be consistent.
The simplest case is complete randomization. Here each treatment arm is a random sample of
the finite population, and the mean of any quantity of these samples will be an unbiased estimator
of the mean for the whole finite population. We would then take all our observed sample means and
plug them into the bounds formulae. Slightly more complex is when the probability of treatment
varies for each student. Here we have to take these probabilities into account. We discuss this
below.
Generally, when using a plug-in approach, our direct estimates will be well behaved in that
they will lie in the [0, 1] interval. The bound estimates and estimated means can, however, lie
outside this interval. For example, the estimated proportion of LQCs or HQCs, because they are
estimated as differences in observed proportions, could be negative: consider the case of randomly
getting a higher estimated proportion of students in LQ schools under treatment than under control,
which could easily occur if the proportion of LQCs was small. We advocate simply truncating the
proportions to the [0, 1] interval. Overall, as long as our estimates are consistent, our bounds will
be.
16
5.1 Estimation with covariate stratification
We illustrate estimation for a post-stratified bound estimate by walking through calculating the
upper bound on the LQC group. First, for each slice k, calculate pˆiklqc and ÎTT
lqc,high
k using the
weighted plug-in methods discussed below. Next, and this is the subtle point, we calculate the
estimated proportion of LQC in the entire sample as
pˆilqc =
∑
k
Nk
N
pˆiklqc.
This estimate comes from the relationship of
pilqc =
1
N
N∑
i=1
1{Ri=lqc} =
1
N
K∑
k=1
Nk
1
Nk
∑
i:Xi=k
1{Ri=lqc} =
K∑
k=1
Nk
N
piklqc.
We calculate the overall proportion this way (as opposed to taking the estimate from the raw,
unsliced sample) so the slice weights sum to 1.10 To obtain the overall bound, we would then plug
these estimated values into Equation 7. The other bounds are all analogous.
5.2 Assessing uncertainty
Once we have obtained bounds, we might wish to put uncertainty intervals on these bounds. Unfor-
tunately, quantifying uncertainty for set identified parameters is technically challenging. See Canay
and Shaikh [2016] for a recent review. We adopt a straightforward approach via the case-resampling
bootstrap. For the case-resampling bootstrap we (1) repeatedly resample the data and recalculate
the bounds on the resampled data; and then (2) take the 5th percentile of the lower bound and the
95th percentile of the upper bound to get an overall adjusted 95% confidence bound.11
This adjusted bound is not a 95% confidence interval for the full true bound, but it does have
95% confidence for containing the true parameter, as long as the estimation uncertainty is on the
same order as or smaller than the true bound width. While current mathematical theory suggests
that this bootstrap could break down in certain extreme cases, such as when the true parameters
are at the limits of their bounds, we have found in further simulation work (not shown) that the
bootstrap tends to work quite well in practice. For additional discussion see Yang and Small [2016]
or Bugni [2010]. Furthermore, the bootstrap even performs admirably when we slice our data into
a relatively large numbers of slices. In particular, even though the estimated bounds within any
given slice can be highly unstable, averaging across the slices produces shorter bounds that are as
stable as the unadjusted bounds.
5.3 Incorporating Weights
In the ECHS study, a student’s probability of treatment assignment varied by demographics and
other factors. In particular, some lotteries were more selective, and within some lotteries some
10If we estimate our pir with our entire sample we will get different values. The slice-averaging method is a form of
post-stratification, so we are getting adjusted estimates that align with our overall averaging process.
11It may seem odd that we can merge two 1 − α level confidence intervals (rather than 1 − α/2-level) to get an
overall 1−α coverage. We can do this because of the bound itself. Due to the bound, as long as the bound is suitably
wide, we get proper coverage because if the parameter is close to a given extreme of the bound, the only possible
error in coverage is one-sided. In particular, if the parameter is at the low end, we only care about coverage of our
lower interval. If at the upper, only the upper interval. This mutual exclusion means we do not need to “split” our
α across both intervals.
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students were given higher chances of a slot for equity reasons. In such cases each treatment
arm is a probability sample of the finite population, and we need to take the varying student-
level probabilities of selection into account. Fortunately this is straightforward due to the known
assignment mechanism.
Let si = P{Zi = 1} be the probability of student i being selected into the treatment arm; then
1 − si is the probability for being in the control arm. We then weight student i by wi ≡ 1/si if it
is in the treatment arm and wi ≡ 1/(1− si) if control:
wi = Zi
1
si
+ (1− Zi) 1
1− si .
To illustrate estimation, consider estimating ρ0e, the proportion of those in the control arm who
enrolled in an ECHS school. One simple estimator for ρ0e is
pˆ0e =
1
N
∑
i
1
1− si (1− Zi)1{Si=e} =
∑
i:Zi=0
wi1{Si=e},
as wi = 1/(1−si) for control students. Because E [1− Zi] = 1−si, the overall estimator is unbiased:
E [pˆ0e] = ρ0e.
The above, generally called a Horvitz-Thompson estimator [Horvitz and Thompson, 1952] or
the inverse probability of treatment weighted (IPTW) estimator, is the simplest. It is unbiased,
but is often suboptimal; Horvitz-Thompson estimators can be highly unstable. In particular, it
does not adjust for unlucky draws with imbalance in the number of students with large weights.
The usual repair is to divide the sum not by the expected total weight N but the total weight
we actually sampled. This is in fact the more natural weighted average of our sampled students. It
is slightly biased, but this bias is usually negligible. Our final estimator, called a Ha`jek estimator,
is then
pˆ0e =
1
Z
∑
i:Zi=0
wi1{Si=e} with Z =
∑
i:Zi=0
wi.
Similarly, our estimate of Y 0e would be
Ŷ0e =
1
Z
∑
i:Zi=0
wiY
obs
i ,
using the same normalizing constant Z. See Sa¨rndal et al. [2003] for a canonical overview of survey
sampling methods.
All of these estimators are consistent: as sample size grows, they will converge on the true
finite population values. This means the associated bounds are consistent as well. (We do not here
discuss the finite sample asymptotics behind a formal argument; it is relatively straightforward.)
Importantly, the dependence of assignment patterns across students (e.g., from a block-randomized
experiment) does not matter for the consistency. This is important because it means when we slice
our sample, we can still use our individual weights without modification, even if we slice across
randomization blocks. Finally, the weights used can be any weights to generalize from a sample to
a population. In particular, non-response or survey weights could be incorporated as above.
6 Simulation Study
We simulate a series of fake data sets where students have three latent traits that govern their
compliance behaviors and outcomes. We use this complex model so we can generate data with
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different predictiveness in our covariates while keeping the same distribution of effects and outcomes
in order to examine how different kinds of covariates improve bounds for the same data.
The three latent traits, all standard normal, are predictive of three different things:
1. U1, a latent principal variable, determines whether the student is in a high or low quality
school context. Even if a student is an ECHS always-taker, he or she could still be in such a
context.
2. U2, the compliance variable, determines proclivity to go to an ECHS school. Those students
with very high U2 are ECHS always-takers, and those with low U2 are always-takers of their
school context from above.
3. U3, the prognostic variable, is students’ baseline ability, and predicts outcome (which is
generated via a logistic model).
So, for example, a student with low U1, U2, U3 would be a Low-Quality Always Taker, and
would be more at risk of a zero for an outcome, relative to his or her peers. A midrange value
of U2 would be a complier, and a high value of U2 would be an ECHS always-taker. This data
generating process is parameterized by β, the predictive strength of U3 on the outcome, ωr,z, the
mean outcome for students in strata r under treatment z, and the five strata proportions pir. Our
observed covariates, Xti, t = 1, 2, 3, are noisy versions of the Ut:
Xti = Uti + ti with ti ∼ N(0, σ2t ).
The greater the noise (determined by the σ2t ), the weaker the connection between the covariates and
the true structure of the data generating process. Details of the data generation process, including
how we connect our latent traits to observed school attendance behavior and outcomes, are in the
Supplementary Material.
For our presented study, we calibrated our simulation by selected values for our baseline prog-
nostic predictiveness β, our school effects ωr,z, and our proportions pir so the resulting data would
closely match characteristics of the actual ECHS data (see Kern et al. [2016] for further discussion
of calibration). We made the Y zs, the marginal means of the six directly observable groups defined
by treatment assignment and observed school type attended, as well as M0 and M1, the overall
complier mean outcomes under control and treatment, match the ECHS estimates. These choices
ensured that our overall complier average causal effect was approximately 0.07, again matching the
ECHS data. Matching these moments still gives leeway, however, for selecting some of the ω values.
We tuned the final ω to give a slightly negative treatment impact to the HQC group and a large
positive impact to the LQC group to examine cases where the true values were near the limits of
the bounds. We also matched our sample size of N = 3820. We also provide code in case readers
wish to try different parameter combinations.
As a baseline we first examine how the unadjusted bounds performed by averaging the unad-
justed bound width across 30 no-noise datasets. With no adjustment we found very short bounds
(average width of 0.06) for the LQCs and much wider bounds (average of 0.39) for the HQC. This
comes from the LQC being such a large share (about 87%) of the compliers. The HQC bounds
are still slightly informative, likely due to the generally high average outcomes overall, causing the
bounds to be truncated from above at 1.
We can then imagine stratifying on any combination of our covariates X1 (a principal-score
style variable), X2 (a variable predicting compliance), and X3 (a variable predicting the outcome).
We can also vary the predictive power of our Xt by adjusting σ
2
t to see how strong our predictors
need to be to see gains in our bounds.
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For each σ2, we generated a single dataset with randomly assigned treatment and corresponding
observed outcomes. Then, for each covariate, we sliced our data into K = 4 equal slices and
estimated the overall bounds based on our synthetic data. We also calculated an approximate
R2 measure of how predictive the used covariate was for its intended purpose to help comparison
across variable types and help connect to applied practice. (See Supplementary Material for details
on these R2 measures.) Figure 2 shows the resulting widths of the intervals, as a percent of the
corresponding unadjusted width, for the ITTs for both the low and high quality compliers for
different levels of noise. There is variation in the individual points due to the natural uncertainty
from the data generation process. We smoothed the bound widths from the individual datasets
and simulation trials with loess lines. Several trends, discussed next, are evident.
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Figure 2: Percent width of bounds (relative to no adjustment) as a function of
the predictive power of covariates for simulation mimicking structure of ECHS
data. Note that R2 measures are only approximately comparable across co-
variates as the covariates are predicting different things. Far right of lines
correspond to no noise added to the original Uti.
Stratifying on X1 (a principal variable). X1 predicts the environment of the student, i.e.,
whether they would go to a high or low quality school if they did not go to an ECHS school. This
means High-Quality and Low-Quality compliers will tend to be in different strata.
We see that stratifying on X1 can be highly useful: if we can form strata that are predominantly
high- or low-quality compliers only, then we have good precision for those strata. When we average
these strata-level bounds, we get good overall bounds as well. For example, in a strata dominated
by HQC, we have tight bounds for HQC and loose ones for LQC. For the strata dominated by LQC
it is the reverse. When we average, the loose bounds get low weight since they do not represent a
large portion of the overall population. See the Supplementary Material for further illustration of
this.
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Stratifying on X2 (a compliance variable). Being able to predict whether a student is an
always-taker or complier is not very useful for tightening bounds. We see in Figure 2 that the
bounds tend to be about as wide as using no stratification, regardless of the predictive power of
this covariate. The reason stratifying on compliance is not useful is that, at least in this particular
context, we can point identify the means of the always takers and subtract them out. From
an identification point of view, they therefore impact little. This suggests that, more broadly,
practitioners should focus on finding covariates that distinguish among those strata where quantities
of interest are not point identified.
Stratifying on X3 (a prognostic variable). In our considered scenario U3 is fairly predictive
of the outcome. When slicing our sample by X3 in the no-noise case, the average outcome for the
control group is about 67% in the first slice and 100% for the last. Slicing the sample on such a
prognostic X3 does tighten bounds for the HQCs, as is seen in Figure 2 on the left hand side. The
gains primarily come from the extreme strata: when most students have 0s for their outcome or
most have 1s, the greater homogeneity allows for tighter bounds.
Discussion. Overall, forming slices that are mostly one type of complier or the other is the key
for getting tighter bounds under this framework. Slicing based on a variable predictive of the
outcome also provides gains if one can form groups that are close to the maximum or minimum
outcome value possible. One might naturally ask whether forming slices based on both principal
and prognostic variables could be useful. It can. Because information of both of these scores is
constraining the bounds by different methods, a combination does provide greater tightness (see
the lowest line on Figure 2). Unfortunately, slicing on both variables does create a large number
of strata and estimation within those strata can be quite unstable. Then again, averaging across
these strata, as they are independent, could give the stability back. Generally we found for our
sample size of a few thousand that 12 slices, or even more, worked effectively; see supplement. One
might imagine further stabilizing this estimation with some sort of smoothing; we leave this as an
important area of future investigation.
As a further exploration, we examined other parameter values. In particular we examined cases
where the overall mean outcome was not so close to 1 for so many of the strata. The general
trends found above replicated; see details and further commentary in the Supplementary Material.
Overall, slicing on both a principle-style and a prognostic-style covariate gives the best bounds.
The former is important because within a stratum the bound width, especially when the mean
outcome is near 0.5, is governed by the ratio of complier proportions. The latter is important for
taking advantage of the truncation.
7 Analysis of the ECHS dataset
We return to the ECHS evaluation and examine how using different covariates reduced the width
of our bounds. These results were obtained by estimating the component proportions and means
and plugging them in to the bounds formulae. All calculations using the ECHS data make use
of the ECHS sample weights that capture the students’ different, known, probabilities of winning
the lotteries. These probabilities differed because some Early College High Schools gave priority
to groups underrepresented in higher education, and because different sites had different levels of
over-subscription.
First, using a strategy analogous to calculating the relative sizes of the strata, we estimated
the means of different baseline demographic and achievement covariates of these strata to further
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ECHS Low Quality High Quality Low Quality High Quality
Always Takers Always Takers Always Takers Compliers Compliers
(N=43) (N=259) (N=53) (N=1328) (N=220)
Demographics
American Indian 0.0% 1.1% 4.0% 1.0% 0.9%
Asian 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% 1.0% 3.3%
Black 23.5% 34.0% 23.5% 29.0% 15.0%
Hispanic 10.7% 8.2% 0.0% 7.1% 5.5%
Multi-racial 3.9% 3.4% 11.3% 3.6% 2.7%
White 61.9% 52.3% 61.2% 58.4% 72.7%
Male 45.1% 38.7% 30.1% 40.1% 39.2%
Socioeconomic Background
First Generation College 27.6% 46.2% 36.1% 41.5% 41.4%
Free/Reduced Price Lunch 48.3% 50.0% 44.0% 50.6% 35.3%
Exceptionality
Learning Disabled 2.1% 1.2% 3.8% 2.6% 0.5%
Gifted 10.4% 9.1% 0.0% 9.4% 4.8%
Ever Retained in grade 7.5% 2.9% 1.8% 3.1% 1.7%
8th Grade Achievement
Math - pass 74.3% 80.6% 87.2% 80.8% 97.0%
Reading - pass 77.0% 78.2% 85.9% 79.5% 92.5%
Algebra - take up 39.8% 24.5% 26.3% 23.2% 25.2%
Table 5: Summary statistics of the five principal strata
Age Math Read
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Figure 3: Means of the continuous pre-treatment covariates by strata for the
ECHS data with approximate 95% confidence intervals.
characterize these different populations. Results are in Table 5 and Figure 3. The 8th grade scores
are standardized by year to account for different scales in years students were tested. The baseline
characteristics of students across our five strata vary substantially; thus differential impacts across
these groups may be due to differences in characteristics rather than differences in the type of high
school they attended. For example, among compliers who attended high quality schools, 35% were
eligible for free lunch, substantially less than the other groups, which implies that the high quality
schools available to students participating in lotteries may have been located in higher income
areas. These students also outperformed students in other strata in 8th grade: 97% passed the
Math End-of-Grade exam in 8th grade and 93% passed the English exam. Passing rates for students
in other strata range from 74% to 87%. However, despite these differences, a similar proportion of
high quality compliers and low quality compliers would be first-generation college students if they
attended college.
Those who would always attend their non-ECHS school regardless of ECHS offer (the always-
takers) appear similar to their complier counterparts. The low quality always-takers, for example,
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have similarly low pass rates to the low quality compliers. The high quality always-takers also
appear similar to the high quality compliers, although their small numbers makes inference difficult.
The first and fifth rows of Table 6, summarizing Table 4, present the results of bounding without
using baseline covariates. Under assignment to control, 86% of low-quality compliers are on-track
at the end of 9th grade. Under assignment to treatment, the bounds indicate that between 94%
and 100% of the low-quality-compliers are on-track. This translates to an ITT effect for low-quality
compliers of between 8.1 and 13.7 percentage points. Even at the lower bound, this effect is larger
than the overall ITT estimate. For the high-quality compliers, we estimate that nearly all (98.6%)
are on track at the end of 9th grade under assignment to control, and our bounds indicate that
between 65% and 100% of high quality compliers are on-track under assignment to treatment.
Thus, we bound the treatment effect for high-quality compliers to be between -34% and 1%. The
impact associated with attending an ECHS appears to be much less pronounced and possibly
negative for students who otherwise would attend a high quality high school, most likely owing to
the strong outcomes these students experience when they are not offered the ECHS opportunity.
That is, because nearly all of these students would be on-track at the end of ninth grade without
the ECHS opportunity, there is little room for improvement in their on-track status. The bounds
on the treatment effect that we estimate for high-quality compliers is quite wide mainly because
this group makes up a small share of the overall sample.
We then employed several strategies to tighten the bounds on the treatment impacts for the two
complier groups. These results are also summarized in Table 6. We first utilized a baseline measure
of student achievement. Specifically, we subdivided the sample into quartiles based on performance
on the North Carolina 8th grade End-of-Grade math assessment.12 Middle school math scores
are prognostic, as they are predictive of whether a student will be on-track in 9th grade. Our R2
measure for this variable was 0.11. We calculated the bounds for each quartile of students and
averaged the results together, weighting by the number of students in each principal stratum in
each quartile. The bounds on both the high-quality and low-quality compliers are tightened by
32% through this stratification method, much more than we expected given our simulation study.
We then grouped students based on the school they attended in 8th grade (the year in which
they applied to the ECHS). We chose 8th grade school based on the notion that students’ 8th
grade schools are highly predictive of the high school they would attend, given predominant school
feeder patterns. Sorting students on a characteristic that predicts principal stratum membership
will create more homogenous strata and produce tighter bounds. We gave each 8th grade school a
score for each year by calculating the percentage of students in the ECHS study from that school
who subsequently attended a high quality high school. High school quality is measured for the
year the student was in 8th grade, so students do not contribute to the quality rating of their
chosen 9th grade school. The R2 measure here was 0.6; this variable is highly predictive and so
we would expect great gains in our bounds, given the simulation study. Using this measure, we
split the sample into quartiles.13 Finally, we calculated the bounds for each of the quartiles and
combined the results, weighting for the number of students in each stratum and quartile. This
128th grade test scores are not available for all students. 11% of students in our sample are missing 8th grade test
scores. Students who applied to an ECHS lottery, but did not attend a North Carolina public school will not have 8th
grade test score data. These students make up 20% of the missing observations. Other missingness can be attributed
to lapses in administrative data. We used regression imputed scores for students who were missing test scores, using
pre-treatment covariates only, and not using treatment assignment. Importantly, the independence of the treatment
assignment to the imputation step means imputation under misspecification would not impact the validity of the
bounds.
13We had one technicality here. Several 8th grade schools had tied scores of 0 for some of their years so we broke
ties using the overall percentage of students across the years of the study who attended a high quality high school
(the quality metrics of some high-schools changed across time) so we could have well-defined quartiles of students.
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process resulted in narrower bounds on treatment effects for both the high-quality compliers and
low-quality compliers as compared to the prognostic math score approach.
Our third approach was to stratify students on both their 8th grade achievement and their 8th
grade schools. Within each quartile based on middle school, we sorted students into three equally
size groups based on their standardized 8th grade math test score, calculated the strata-level bounds
in the resulting 12 slices, and averaged appropriately. This results in a narrower bound than when
we just use one or the other of our covariates. For the HQC group, we bound the treatment impact
between -8 and 3 percentage points, which is about a 69% smaller range than the results of the
bounding exercise without stratification. Conceptually, we have generated slices that separate, as
much as possible, the LQC and HQC students. Then, by further slicing to group students likely to
be on track, we created relatively homogenous groups which gives us narrower bounds by clipping
the upper bound by 1. This provided both benefits, giving the tightest bounds.
We finally incorporated estimation uncertainty with the bootstrap. The right three columns of
Table 6 show the final impact bounds adjusted for this uncertainty. The estimation uncertainty
expands the bounds rather substantially, but as the LQC and HQC intervals do not overlap, we
have good evidence that the impact for the LQC group is higher than the HQC group. We can see
an illustration of the bootstrap on Figure 4, where we plot 100 plausible treatment impact sets for
100 bootstrap draws. The final bounds are formed by dropping the 5% highest and lowest extremes
from these sets. (See discussion of estimation for why 5% and not 2.5%.)
Both Figure 1(b) and the bootstrap adjusted version Figure 4 allow exploration of the possible
trade-offs between impact on the LQC group and the HQC group. For Figure 4, any point in the
central mass of grey lines is plausible. We see that in order for the impact on LQC to be on the
larger end of the scale, the impact on the HQC group would have to be substantially negative.
While this would be consistent with the data, one might argue from a substantive standpoint that
the near zero HQC effects coupled with the lower end of the LQC effects (of about 8 percentage
points) is most plausible. We finally note that, as being at the absolute extreme ends of our bounds
is substantively implausible here, we have good confidence in the bootstrap.
Stratification Co Tx ITT Bounds % Adj. Final
Mean Mean Bounds width width Bounds Width
High Quality Compliers
None 98.6 64.5 - 100.0 -34.1 - 1.4 35.5 100 -43.4 - 3.8 47.2
Math 98.0 75.9 - 100.0 -22.1 - 2.0 24.1 68 -28.9 - 4.9 33.8
Middle School 97.6 84.1 - 100.0 -13.5 - 2.4 15.9 45 -19.0 - 4.5 23.5
Both 97.5 89.1 - 100.0 -8.4 - 2.5 10.9 31 -13.2 - 5.1 18.4
Low Quality Compliers
None 86.3 94.4 - 100.0 8.1 - 13.7 5.6 100 5.7 - 15.3 9.5
Math 86.4 94.3 - 98.1 7.9 - 11.7 3.8 68 6.1 - 13.8 7.7
Middle School 86.5 94.0 - 97.4 7.5 - 10.8 3.4 59 5.3 - 12.8 7.6
Both 86.6 94.0 - 96.3 7.4 - 9.7 2.3 40 5.4 - 12.1 6.7
Table 6: ECHS treatment effect bounds with and without covariate stratifica-
tion. All outcomes are in percents. “Percent width” compares bound width to
width when no covariates are used. Final columns display bootstrap adjusted
bounds and widths that takes into account estimation uncertainty.
24
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
−
0.
4
−
0.
3
−
0.
2
−
0.
1
0.
0
0.
1
ITTlqc
IT
T h
qc
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
−
0.
4
−
0.
3
−
0.
2
−
0.
1
0.
0
0.
1
ITTlqc
IT
T h
qc
Figure 4: Bootstrap adjusted bounds for ECHS data with plausible sets of
treatment effects. Left hand side is raw bounds, right hand side is bounds
from using both middle school and math scores. Green lines indicate bounds
incorporating estimation uncertainty.
8 Conclusions
Estimating treatment effects for subgroups defined by post-treatment behaviors can be challenging,
as we can only observe some of these groups as mixtures. The researcher then typically has a choice:
impose assumptions which allow for direct estimation (e.g., conditional independence assumptions
of strata membership and outcome conditional on pre-treatment covariates), model the relationship
of the covariates and outcomes in order to separate the mixtures, or calculate bounds to obtain a
range of plausible estimates that are consistent with the data.
In this work, we explore this last choice, demonstrating how to calculate such bounds in the
context of an experiment where we aim to separate the overall complier average causal effect
according to the behaviors that compliers would exhibit when assigned to control. We show that
these bounds can be informative, producing a description of treatment impacts more nuanced
than an overall average treatment effect. We also demonstrate how such bounds can be tightened
using covariates either predictive of outcome or stratum membership. In this context, we find
that covariates predicting stratum membership tends to lead to tighter bounds, but that one can
tighten bounds even further by using both types of covariates, thus generating subgroups that are
as homogenous as possible in terms of both stratum membership and the outcome.
In our evaluation of ECHS we used single variables that predicted outcome and compliance
type. As an alternative, one could regress the outcome (or school type attended) on the full range
of covariates in order to make prognostic or principal scores, and stratify based on those scores,
which could give additional gains. This approach might be important when one has no single,
strongly predictive covariate to use. For one example of a similar approach see Chan [2017], who
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uses bounds to generalize experiments. Here, even if the model were misspecified, this process would
give valid bounds as the scores would be pre-treatment quantities, provided the model fitting were
not dependent on the treatment assignment. This independence can be achieved by sample-splitting
(see, e.g., Abadie et al. [2013]). We leave this for future work.
When taken as a whole, we believe that, when designing studies, practitioners should spend
effort on collecting covariates that not only strongly predict the outcome (which is typically done
with, e.g., pre-tests) but also that predict the post-treatment behaviors of interest. We have found
in both our simulations and applied example that stratifying on both these types of variables gives
the strongest gains. Stratifying on principal variables predictive of behavior is critical; without them
the bounds can be quite wide. Despite the risk of wide, uninformative bounds, we nevertheless
advocate for using them, as the additional assumptions typically necessary for point estimation are
generally quite strong and often implausible. See, for example, Feller et al. [2017].
For our particular ECHS study, we found the estimated treatment impact on students who
would attend a low-quality high school is consistently larger than the impact on the whole sample,
while the range of impacts on students who would otherwise attend a high quality school includes
0. This result comes from the systematically high achievement of the students attending the high
quality schools; because they are predominantly on track, there is little room for improvement.
Broadly, these findings point to the importance of attending to context when interpreting pro-
gram impacts [Lemons et al., 2014]. Specific to the ECHS context, these findings suggest that
early college high schools may be a particularly strong intervention for those communities in which
students have little access to high quality high schools. Policy makers looking to support educa-
tional attainment for these students may look to the early college model as a potentially positive
intervention.
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Supplementary Material
for
“Bounding, an accessible method for estimating
principal causal effects, examined and explained”
1 Data generation process for the simulation study
We parameterize our data generating process with the proportions of the five strata, the predictive
power of U3, and the impact of the three school types on student outcomes. In formal terms, our
model is
U1i, U2i, U3i ∼ N(0, 1) (all independent)
Hi =
{
hq U1i > Φ
−1 (γ0)
lq else
Si(0) =
{
e U2i > Φ
−1(1− pieat)
Hi else
Si(1) =
{
e U2i > Φ
−1 (γ1(Hi))
Hi else
P{Yi(z) = 1} = logit−1 (βU3 + ωRi,z)
with Φ(·) being the normal CDF, the Yi being Bernoulli coin flips with the given probabilities, and
with
γ0 = 1− pihqc + pihqat
1− pieat
γ1(hq) =
pihqc
pihqc + pihqat
(1− pieat) + pieat
γ1(lq) =
pilqc
pilqc + pilqat
(1− pieat) + pieat
for a given, pre-specified collection of strata proportions. For interpretation, γ0 is the relative
proportion of students in a low-quality context, ignoring the ECHS always-takers. The γ1 are cut-
offs for going to an ECHS school under treatment, and will generally be less than γ0 if we have
positive proportions of compliers.
The β is the slope connecting U3 to Y , with high values making U3 more discriminatory. The
ωr,z are the mean impacts for each strata under treatment and control (so ωeat,0 = ωeat,1, etc., for
the always-takers). These quantities shift the probability of on-track by some set amount on the
logistic scale. The ωlqc,1 − ωlqc,0 represents the impact of treatment on LQCs going from a LQ
school to an ECHS school. This model allows for heterogeneous effects for the different compliers.
For our ECHS simulation we set our β to 5.65, our ωr,0 to 17, 8, 13, 6, 6.5 and our ωlqc,1 to 9.6
and ωhqc,1 to 11. The pis were set to 0.03, 0.03, 0.11, 0.11, 0.72. 58% of the units were randomized to
treatment. For the primary plots we systematically varied the σ21 = σ
2
2 = σ
2
3 = σ
2 from to attempt
to achieve from 0 to 3.
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1.1 Calculating R2
For each Xt variable we calculated an R
2 that could be estimated from the observed data. We
wanted to use R2 measures that practitioners could use to assess their actually available covariates
in practice. For each measure we regressed an observed binary outcome or behavior onto the
covariate using a logistic regression. We then compared the fitted model to a null modelM0 using
McFadden’s R2:
R2 = 1− logL(M)/ logL(M0),
where L(M) is the likelihood of model M given data.
The models were as follows:
• For a principle-style variable X1 we regressed attendance of a low-quality school onto X1 on
the subset of control-group students not observed to be in an ECHS school.
• For a compliance-style variable X2 we regressed attendance at an ECHS school under the
treatment condition onto X2 for the treatment group. This will be reasonable provided the
proportion of ECHS always-takers is not too high.
• For a prognostic-style variable X3 we regressed outcome onto X3 and school type attended
for the control group. Here the null model is the outcome regressed on just school type
attendance dummies.
These R2 measures ideally indicate the the strength of the covariates relationship to the under-
lying structures of interest. The simulations can then be used as a diagnostic by comparing actual
estimated R2 measures found in ones data to the simulation findings. The ability to compare co-
variates is admittedly not perfect. In particular, for the prognostic covariate, the R2 measure is
typically low even in the no-noise case, due to the mixture of different principal strata.
2 Characteristics of the plausible set of effects under slicing
We here argue that, when we stratify on a covariate and then combine to get overall bounds, we
still get a linear constraint between the impact on the LQC and the impact on the HQC groups
regardless of how we slice. In particular, the set of possible pairs ITThqc, ITTlqc will lie on a line.
Furthermore, up to estimation error, this line will be the same line as the possible pairs obtained
from calculating bounds on the full dataset without slicing.
To see this first note that the overall average control-side means must be the same as the non-
sliced case as they are all point identified. Similarly for the overall proportions of the five principal
strata. We then focus on the aggregate overall treatment means. The weighted average of these
means, weighted by the relative proportions pihqc and pilqc must equal M1. But these pairs of means
are precisely those that lie on the line of possible mean pairs, which induces the line of possible
treatment effect pairs.
This means that even after slicing, we can return the set of possible pairs of effects as all points
on the line segment between the two extremes of (ITT lowlqc , ITT
high
hqc ) and (ITT
high
lqc , ITT
low
hqc ).
These equalities are on the population parameters. Because we are actually estimating these
quantities, and because the slicing is actually a form of post-stratification, giving adjusted estimates
of the overall means and proportions, the set of solutions from a sliced bound will not necessarily
be on the exact same line as the overall, although they should be close. They would align with
overall estimated bounds calculated from the post-stratified overall mean outcomes and proportions,
however.
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3 Illustration of different bound precisions across slices
Figure 5 shows the individual strata-level bounds when stratifying on a variable predictive of strata
type (percent high quality school attendance) for the ECHS data. The first slice has only LQC
and so we have a single point for our bounds for the LQCs and no contribution for the HQCs. The
second slice gives tight bounds for the LQC and loose ones for HQC, but this stratum is dominated
by LQC, so it has high weight for the LQC bound when we average. The loose HQC bound gets
low weight and so the lack of precision does not matter much. This is further illustrated on Table 7,
which shows how the slicing makes slices with more LQC or more HQC, which changes the bound
width for each group. In particular, see how as the weight of the LQC strata for each slice goes
down the ratio governing the bound width for this group goes up.
B eat hqat hqc lqat lqc pihqc pilqc pihqc/pilqc
[0,0.000109] 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.32 0% 85% 0.00
(0.000109,0.375] 0.46 0.08 0.03 0.35 0.26 2% 75% 0.03
(0.375,0.611] 0.12 0.30 0.03 0.25 0.30 2% 83% 0.02
(0.611,1] 0.14 0.62 0.94 0.14 0.11 55% 31% 1.76
TOTAL 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 14% 69% 0.21
Table 7: Relative proportions of strata within slices defined by quantiles of the
principal variable of the middle school feeding patterns. Final three columns
shows the proportion of HQC and LQC in the slice and the ratio of the LQC
and HQC proportions, which governs bound width for the LQC group.
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Figure 5: Variation of bounds across slices of ECHS data when slicing on the
principal variable of percent attendance to a high-quality school. Far left stra-
tum has no students in the control going to a high-quality school, so bounds
are [−1, 1] for the HQC. Middle strata are primarily LQC, so the HQC bounds
are still uninformative. By contrast, the final, far right stratum has tight HQC
bounds due to both being a high proportion of HQC and having high propor-
tion of 1s for outcomes. The LQC bounds are here the widest, on the other
hand.
For the prognostic-style variable with the ECHS study we used 8th grade math. When we
stratify on a standardized version of this variable we see that for both the treatment and control
groups the mean outcomes generally increase. See Table 8. In particular, for the fourth stratum,
virtually all of both treatment and control students are on-track. This constraint gives the bounds
as shown on Figure 6. When we average the very wide bounds and the much narrower bounds
3
across the strata, we obtained shorter overall bounds.
As a side-note, the ITT impacts vary by this covariate substantially. In particular, we estimate
a 9 percentage point gain for the weakest stratum, and only a 2 percentage point gain for the
strongest.
B % (Co) % (Tx) Ŷ0 Ŷ1
[-4.17,-0.649] 26% 25% 73% 82%
(-0.649,0.000991] 23% 27% 88% 96%
(0.000991,0.651] 24% 24% 94% 98%
(0.651,3.54] 26% 24% 97% 99%
Table 8: Mean outcomes for ECHS data for slices defined by 8th grade math
score for both treatment and control groups. Middle columns denote proportion
of sample in each slice for treatment and control sides.
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Figure 6: Variation of bounds across slices of ECHS data when slicing on the
prognostic variable of 8th grade math. Far left we see wide bounds for both
LQC and HQC due to being far from the extreme of 1. Far right the bounds
are tight as virtually all students have an outcome of 1, leaving little room for
any impact.
4 Further simulations
We further examined bound performance by exploring other parameter values in our Data Generat-
ing Process. Figure 7 shows a case where the two groups are more balanced and the mean outcomes
are lower. Parameters are set so the overall CACE is 0.12, with a mean complier outcome under
control of 0.47 and under treatment of 0.59. We also sliced into 6 slices rather than 4.
Here, with β = 4, X3 is highly predictive of the outcome in the no-noise setting. For this setting,
the average outcome for the control group in the first slice is about 1%, and for the last it is 99%.
(X3 has an R
2 of 0.58.) Slicing the sample on such a prognostic X3 substantially tightens bounds,
as is seen in Figure 7: the bound is about a third of the raw bound width for the σ23 = 0 case (see
the right endpoint of the trend line). The gains primarily come from the extreme strata: when
most students have 0s for their outcome or most have 1s, the greater homogeneity gives tighter
bounds. For further illustration see prior section investigating bounds within the ECHS slices.
Overall, in this scenario the benefits of stratification are even more striking than for the ECHS
scenario, although bounds are also systematically much wider. This simulation further shows that
4
having outcomes very close to 1 (or 0) overall is not necessary for informative bounds, provided
that one has reasonably predictive covariates.
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Figure 7: Percent width of bounds (relative to no adjustment) as a function of
the predictive power of covariates for alternative simulation scenario.
Compliance Variables. Note that in the auxiliary simulation slicing on the compliance variable
is beneficial when the variable is highly predictive (the low noise case). This gain comes from a
side effect: due to the imbalance in size of the LQC and HQC groups, of one of the slices having
many HQCs and no LQCs.
4.1 Examining sample size
To illustrate the impact of varying sample size, we re-ran the auxillary simulation with different
sample sizes ranging from N = 100 to N = 3600. Figure 8 shows the results of 100 random trials at
each sample size. We see the average width of the bounds is stable, unrelated to sample size. The
variability of the bound width, however, goes down with sample size as expected. In this scenario,
for the methods with reasonably informative bounds, variability of sample size is on the same order
as bound width for the larger sample sizes. This suggests adjustment of bounds to account for
uncertainty is generally a real concern.
Examining number of slices We ran a final simulation to briefly investigate bootstrap coverage
and the impact of the number of slices (we are exploring this further in separate work). We generated
data under our ECHS simulation scenario with moderate noise for our propensity variable X1.
Figure 9 shows the results. We find that as the number of slices increases, there is a slight bias in
the estimated intervals, giving intervals that are on average up to 8% smaller than the true intervals
for K = 30 (see the mean width being lower than oracle width for larger K).
That being said, the bootstrap adjusted bounds contained the true parameters 97% of the time;
they were highly conservative. Without bootstrap adjustment, however, the LQC bounds had only
50% coverage (due to the parameters being near the extreme end of the interval).
The uncertainty in bound estimation did not increase as K increased. The true standard errors
and average estimated standard errors had no real relationship with K for K > 1. This shows that
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Figure 8: Average width and variability of width of bounds as function of
sample size.
averaging many imperfectly estimated slices gives generally good stability in estimation. This can
be seen by how the average width of the bootstrap adjusted bounds tends to be a constant amount
larger than the initially estimated bounds.
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Figure 9: Average bound width, oracle bound width (where all identifable
parameters are known), and bootstrap-adjusted bound width as a function of
number of slices for propensity variable X1 with R
2 ≈ 0.5 for ECHS simulation.
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